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INTRODUCTION
The American legal system's understanding of constitutional
principles is ever evolving. On June 24, 2002, in the case of Ring v.
Arizona,1 new insight was given into Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
In overturning its own precedent, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial includes the right
to have a jury find aggravating factors where those factors are func-
tional elements of the crime. 2 This decision combined with our his-
torical understanding of the Sixth Amendment fundamentally alters
the constitutional guarantees that govern America's criminal sentenc-
ing scheme. For nearly two years scholars and lower courts alike have
tried to determine and apply the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in light
of Rings new constitutional sentencing requirement. However, these
varying interpretations have only led to a legal limbo resulting in baf-
fling inconsistencies. 3
The implications of this new legal premise-that sentencing fac-
tors can equate to elements of the crime, thereby triggering a defen-
dant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights-are inescapable. Given the
current inconsistencies within the judicial process, sooner or later the
Supreme Court will have to return to the issues it failed to answer
when it announced a new application of the Sixth Amendment in
Ring. Until then, the courts are left to individually decipher the
meaning, scope and application of Ring's new legal premise.
This Note examines the meaning, scope, and effect of our cur-
rent understanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, highlights
the inconsistent applications of those amendments, and endeavors to
fill the gaps left unanswered in Ring by applying the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments as they should be understood today. Part I will set the
stage by examining the necessary historical context for both the Sixth
Amendment and the cases leading up to the modern understanding
of the Sixth Amendment. Implicit in the current understanding of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is the United States Supreme Court's
most recent decision on the issue-Ring v. Arizona. That decision it-
self will be elucidated in Part II. Part III will then explore the incon-
1 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2 Id. at 609.
3 See, e.g., infra Part III.
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sistent applications of the post-Ring Fifth and Sixth Amendments and
endeavor to provide a way to reconcile the issues posed by such incon-
sistent applications. These issues include: whether aggravating factors
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether Rings new-found
understanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should be applied
retroactively, whether aggravating factors now need to be included in
the indictment, whether the new understanding of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments affects hybrid states such as Delaware and Indiana, and
how to properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in light of
our current understanding of the Sixth Amendment. By implement-
ing the changes proposed in this Note, the legal system can achieve a
constitutionally sound and consistent application of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court's decision in Ring was based upon the evolution of the
Sixth Amendment and the jurisprudential conflict that existed prior
to the Court's ruling in Ring. In order to understand Ring, its implica-
tions, and the questions left unanswered by the Court, it is necessary
to first review both the Sixth Amendment and the cases that paved the
way for Ring.
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
An individual's right to a trial by a jury of his peers is codified in
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 This right
extends only to serious criminal offenses-i.e., a right to have a jury
decide one's fate attaches only when the criminal charges achieve the
necessary level of severity.5 Thus, the pivotal question in determining
whether an individual is entitled to ajury trial is: what is the maximum
penalty for the alleged crime?6 Supreme Court decisions dictate that
any crime punishable by more than six months triggers the Sixth
4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
Id.
5 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-61 (1968); Brian W. Bolster, Right to
aJuiy Trial, 86 GEO. L.J. 1618, 1618-19 (1998).
6 Id.
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Amendment right to a trial by a jury, regardless of the actual sentence
imposed. 7 Crimes punishable by six months or less are referred to as
"petty" offenses. Petty offenses do not trigger the Sixth Amendment,
even where the aggregation of multiple petty offenses would exceed
the six-month marker.8 The Sixth Amendment right applies to any
federal prosecutions and, via the Fourteenth Amendment, to any state
prosecutions as well.9
Once the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial has been trig-
gered, the jury's primary function is to make a determination of guilt
or innocence based on a finding of the facts. In making this determi-
nation, the Due Process Clause mandates that the jury must find that
all elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.10 As will become evident in the next section, discussing the
line of cases preceding Ring, the Court has continuously struggled to
define what constitutes an element of the crime.
B. Ring's Antecedent Caselaw
Aggravating factors are most often an issue in death penalty cases.
The death penalty, as understood today, has its roots in Furman v.
7 See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) ("In ordinary criminal
prosecutions, the severity of the penalty authorized, not the penalty actually imposed,
is the relevant criterion."); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970)
(holding that a one-year confinement as punishment for a misdemeanor triggers
right to ajury trial); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 (holding that a defendant sentenced
to sixty days imprisonment for simple battery, which carried a maximum penalty of
two years, was entitled to a jury trial).
8 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 327 (1996) ("The fact that the petitioner
was charged with two counts of a petty offense does not revise the legislative judgment
as to the gravity of that particular offense, nor does it transform the petty offense into
a serious one, to which the jury trial right would apply."). The only time a petty
offense may entitle an individual to ajury trial is when the statutory penalties "are so
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question
is a 'serious' one." Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
Compare United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413, 1415-16 (11th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that there is no right to ajury trial when the maximum penalty for violating the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act is six months imprisonment or five years of
probation and a $10,000 fine), and United States v. Musser, 873 F.2d 1513, 1516 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no right to ajury trial when the maximum penalty
for displaying an unattended sign in a park is six months imprisonment and a $5000
fine), with Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that
there is a right to jury trial where an individual is charged with his third driving while
intoxicated offense and the maximum penalty is a six-month sentence accompanied
by a fifteen-year revocation of one's driver's license).
9 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 595 (2002).
10 In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
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Georgia," a 1972 Supreme Court case which held that giving a jury
complete and uninhibited discretion to determine whether to sen-
tence a guilty defendant to death violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In effect, Furman inval-
idated every death penalty statute in effect at that time.1 2 In response
to the invalidation, states took one of two possible approaches to
bring their death penalty statutes into compliance with the Eighth
Amendment. Under the first approach, most states passed statutes
that listed crimes for which the death penalty was mandatory. 13 How-
ever, these statutes were struck down four years later in Woodson v.
North Carolina.14 Woodson held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment required an evaluation of indi-
vidual circumstances wherever the death penalty may be imposed.15
Meanwhile, other states adopted a second method of using a bi-
furcated jury trial. 16 In the first stage, the jury made a determination
of guilt or innocence. In the second stage, the sentencing stage, the
jury would decide whether to impose the death penalty by considering
aggravating and mitigating factors. On the same day the Court struck
down the mandatory statutes in Woodson, the Court approved the bi-
furcated system in Gregg v. Georgia.1 7 The Court held that the use of
aggravating and mitigating factors passed constitutional muster be-
cause the determination of those factors protected a defendant from
receiving an arbitrary sentence.' 8
Furman, Woodson, and Gregg established that the use of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors provided sufficient procedural safeguards.
However, whether ajury needed to be the one to weigh the existence
of aggravating and mitigating factors remained an open question.
Eight years later, the Supreme Court answered that question in the
negative. In Spaziano v. Florida,19 the Court rejected the argument
that the Constitution required a jury to make the final decision of
imposing the death penalty on a defendant.2 0 In doing so, the Court
upheld the Florida death-sentencing scheme wherein the jury, based
11 408 U.S: 238 (1972).
12 Robert C. Stacy II, State v. McCarver: The Role of Jury Unanimity in Capital Sen-
tencing, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2061, 2067 (1996).
13 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976).
14 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
15 Id. at 303.
16 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179 n.23.
17 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
18 Id. at 206.
19 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
20 Id. at 465.
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on its findings of aggravating and mitigating factors, recommended to
the judge whether to sentence the defendant to death. 21 The judge,
however, was given the right to conduct his own analysis of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors, and to override the jury's decision-even
where that meant imposing death when the jury recommended only
a life sentence.2 2 The Court concluded by stating that although
the Sixth Amendment clearly guarantees the right to a jury trial
at the conviction stage, "[t]he Sixth Amendment never has been
thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of [appropriate
punishment]. "23
Since Spaziano, the Court has continuously struggled to distin-
guish elements of a crime, which must be decided by a jury, from sen-
tencing factors, which do not have to be decided by ajury. First faced
with the issue in 1986 in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,2 4 the Supreme
Court agreed to defer to state legislatures to determine when a fact
was an element of the crime and when it was a sentencing factor. At
issue was Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, which
required "that anyone convicted of certain enumerated felonies [be]
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment
if the sentencing judge f[ound], by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the person 'visibly possessed a firearm' during the commission of
the offense." 25 The Court held that because "[t]he Act operates to
divest the judge of discretion to impose any sentence of less than five
years for the underlying felony [and] . . .does not authorize a sen-
tence in excess of that otherwise allowed for that offense," the finding
that a person "visibly possessed a firearm" was in fact a sentencing
factor and therefore only had to be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. 26 Moreover, the Court stated, "there is no Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on spe-
cific findings of fact."27 The Court did note, however, that its decision
would not bar any additional challenges to state sentencing schemes
under the Due Process Clause. 28
21 Id. at 451 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1983) (stating that a judge must
conduct a balancing test regarding aggravating and mitigating factors regardless of a
jury's recommendation)).
22 Id. at 451-52.
23 Id. at 459.
24 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
25 Id. at 81.
26 Id. at 81-83.
27 Id. at 93 (citing Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459).
28 Id. at 91.
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McMillan left unanswered the question of what happens when a
sentencing factor is used to enhance the maximum sentence for a cer-
tain crime. In Walton v. Arizona,29 the Supreme Court answered pre-
cisely that question. The Sixth Amendment question posed in Walton
revolved around an Arizona statute which said that any defendant
convicted by a jury of first-degree murder was eligible for the death
penalty only if the judge, in the sentencing phase, found at least one
aggravating factor.30 The Court held that the statute was constitu-
tional. In holding such, the Court reasoned that "'[a]ny argument
that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of
death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sen-
tence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court." 3 1
The court extended that line of reasoning in asserting that "Arizona's
aggravating factors [were] standards to guide the making of the
choice between verdicts of death and life imprisonment rather than
'elements of the offense.' "32 Given that the sentencing factors were
construed as being sentencing guidelines, as opposed to elements of
the offense, the determination of guilt by the jury on the elements of
the offense and a separate finding of sentencing factors by the judge,
even where such factors could trigger the death penalty, remained
constitutional.
3 3
The Court revisited this issue in Jones v. United States.
34
This case turn[ed] on whether the federal carjacking statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2119, as it was when petitioner was charged, defined three
distinct offenses or a single crime with a choice of three maximum
penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt
from the requirements of charge and jury verdict.3 5
Under the federal carjacking statute, anyone convicted of carjack-
ing could receive up to fifteen years in prison. If, however, as a sen-
tencing factor, the defendant was found to have caused serious bodily
harm to the victim, the maximum sentence increased to twenty-five
years.3 6 Additionally, if the victim died as a result of the carjacking,
then that finding, as a sentencing factor, increased the penalty to life
imprisonment.37
29 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
30 Id. at 643.
31 Id. at 647 (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990)).
32 Id. at 648-49 (citing Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986)).
33 Id. at 648.
34 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
35 Id. at 229.
36 Id. at 230.
37 Id. at 230.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Souter retreated from the
Court's position in McMillan. In fact, the majority went so far as to
state that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the no-
tice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.38
The Court concluded that although the provisions for serious
bodily harm or death of the victim appeared at first glance to be sen-
tencing factors, in effect they were elements of the crime since they
increased the maximum penalty the convicted could receive.3 9 Jones
thus set forth the "maximum penalty test," which provides that the
decision of whether a fact is a sentencing factor or an element of the
crime turns on whether the finding of such a fact would increase the
maximum penalty available for that crime. 40
A year later, the Court extended the "maximum penalty test" to
the states in Apprendi v. New Jersey.4 1 In Apprendi, the defendant pled
guilty to three counts of weapons possession, a second-degree crime
carrying a sentence of five to ten years.42 The sentence for second-
degree crimes, however, was increased to ten to twenty years if the
convicted defendant was found to have committed the crime based
upon hatred of a particular group.43 The defendant argued that the
"Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require[d] that a
factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison
sentence for an offense . . .be made by a jury on the basis of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."4 4 The appeals court below relied on Mc-
Millan and thus held that "the state legislature decided to make the
hate crime enhancement a 'sentencing factor,' rather than an ele-
ment of an underlying offense-and that decision was within the
State's established power to define the elements of its crimes. '45 Ap-
plying Jones, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's deci-
sion, reasoning that
38 Id. at 243 n.6.
39 Id. at 238-39.
40 See Stephanie B. Stewart, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Protecting the Constitu-
tional Rights of Criminals in Sentencing, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 1193, 1200 (2001) (referring
to the Court's approach as the "maximum penalty test").
41 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
42 Id. at 469-70.
43 Id. at 470.
44 Id. at 469.
45 Id. at 471.
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if a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the
State labels it-must be found by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.
A defendant may not be "expose [d] . . .to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict alone."4 6
The Apprendi Court made clear that the dispositive question was
"not one of form, but of effect."'4 7 Where the legislature effectively
took a penalty-increasing factor out of the hands of the jury and
placed it in the hands of a judge, the legislature had violated the de-
fendant's right to a trial by a jury in which all elements of the crime
must be proven, in the mind of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.48
The Court, however, overtly noted that its decision in Apprendi was not
at odds with Walton because Walton simply allowed a judge to decide
whether or not to impose the maximum penalty rather than, as in
Apprendi, giving the judge the ability to increase the maximum
penalty.49
II. RING V. ARIZONA
The conflicts posed by Walton and Apprendi regarding Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence-despite the Court's attempt to pretend
no conflict existed-culminated in Ring v. Aizona.50 The petitioner,
Timothy Ring, had been charged with murder, armed robbery, and
related charges. 51 Ring and two accomplices had hijacked an ar-
mored van and kidnapped its driver.52 Sheriff's officers found the van
abandoned in the parking lot of a church with the dead driver inside.
More than $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks were missing
from the van. 53 A lawful search of Ring's house revealed a duffle bag
containing more than $271,000 in cash, along with other incriminat-
ing evidence. 54 Instructions on both premeditated murder and felony
46 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
482-83).
47 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
48 Id. at 495-97.
49 Id. at 496. Dissenters in Apprendi found the majority opinion puzzling in light
of the case background, specifically Walton. Dissenters criticized the majority for not
overruling Walton and for pretending that their decision in Apprendi could be recon-
ciled with past cases. Id. at 536-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
51 Id. at 589.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 590.
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murder were given to the jury. Since there was no direct evidence
putting Ring at the scene of the robbery, the jury split on the question
of premeditated murder, but convicted Ring of felony murder.55
Under Arizona law, a conviction for felony murder constituted
first-degree murder, for which the maximum penalty was life impris-
onment. However, Arizona law directed a judge to conduct a "'sepa-
rate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence
of [certain enumerated] circumstances ... for the purpose of deter-
mining the sentence to be imposed.'- 56 Based on the judge's find-
ings, the judge could increase the penalty to death if he found that
there was at least one aggravating factor and that there were no, or
not enough, mitigating factors to call for leniency.57 Between Ring's
trial and sentencing hearing, one of his accomplices pled guilty and
agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in the cases against Ring
and the other accomplice. At Ring's sentencing hearing, the accom-
plice who pled guilty testified that Ring had planned the entire crime
and that Ring had shot the driver. 58 At the conclusion of the sentenc-
ing hearing, the trial judge stated that although Ring's jury conviction
for felony murder did not make him eligible for the death penalty, the
finding of certain aggravating factors could bring the death penalty
into play. Citing the accomplice's testimony, the judge concluded
that Ring was the actual shooter and was also a major participant in
the crime leading to the driver's death. The judge also found the
crime to be especially heinous. 59 Both findings by the judge consti-
tuted aggravating factors. Despite finding a mitigating factor as well,
the judge sentenced Ring to death. 60
On appeal, citing Jones and Apprendi, "Ring argued that Arizona's
capital sentencing scheme violate[d] the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution because it entrust[ed] to a
judge the finding of a fact raising the defendant's maximum pen-
alty."'61 The Arizona Supreme Court found merit in Ring's argument.
The Arizona Supreme Court admitted that the judge's finding did in
55 Id. at 591.
56 Id. at 592 (quoting ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001)).
57 Id. at 592-93.
58 Id. at 593. On cross-examination the accomplice acknowledged that his testi-
mony was inconsistent with the information he had previously supplied to Ring's
counsel. The accomplice accounted for the discrepancy by stating that Ring had
threatened his life. The accomplice also testified that his testimony was "pay back" for
Ring's interference in the accomplice's personal life. Id. at 593-94.
59 Id. at 594-95.
60 Id. at 595. The judge found that Ring's minimal criminal history constituted a
mitigating factor. Id.
61 Id.
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fact increase the maximum penalty. In characterizing the system, it
noted that without the finding of an aggravating factor, a defendant
was not eligible for the death penalty, but with the finding of an aggra-
vating factor (a determination made only by ajudge in the sentencing
phase) a defendant became eligible for the death penalty.62 Moreo-
ver, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that Apprendi and Jones
"raise [d] some question about the continued viability of Walton."' 63
Even though it apparently agreed with Ring's position and questioned
Walton's validity, the high court of the state recognized that it was
bound by the Supremacy Clause to follow the Supreme Court's prece-
dent. Thus, since the Supreme Court had upheld Arizona's death sen-
tencing scheme in Walton, the Arizona Supreme Court "rejected
Ring's constitutional attack" on the State's sentencing scheme. 6 4 Ring
then was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg began by declaring that
the Court "granted Ring's petition for a writ of certiorari, to allay un-
certainty in the lower courts caused by the manifest tension between
Walton and the reasoning of Apprendi.' 65 Recognizing that the con-
struction given to Arizona law by the Arizona Supreme Court was in-
consistent with the Supreme Court's construction of Arizona law in
Walton, the Court held that the State's own interpretation of its law
was authoritative. 66 Under the State's controlling construction of Ari-
zona law, the Court recognized that Walton could not survive the rea-
soning of Apprendi.67 Under Apprendi's reasoning, Arizona's capital
62 State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001).
63 Id. at 1150.
64 Ring, 536 U.S. at 596 (citing Ring, 25 P.3d at 1151).
65 Id. at 596. Ring was not the first case to recognize the tension between Walton
and Apprendi. Justice Ginsburg included the following footnote:
See, e.g., United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 159-60 (4th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (calling the continued authority of Walton in light of Apprendi "per-
plexing"); Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 542 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Apprendi
may raise some doubt about Walton."); People v. Kaczmarek, 741 N.E.2d
1131, 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) ("[W]hile it appears Apprendi extends greater
constitutional protections to noncapital, rather than capital, defendants, the
Court has endorsed this precise principle, and we are in no position to sec-
ond-guess that decision here.").
Id. at 596-97.
66 Id. at 603 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)).
67 Id.
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sentencing scheme was irreconcilable with the guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment.
The Court rejected each argument Arizona offered to justify its
system. First, Arizona argued that the majority's construction of the
statute in Apprendi was correct and thus Ring's conviction fell within
the sentencing range. The Court quickly dismissed this argument
based on the above-mentioned principle that a state's construction of
its own law is controlling. 68 Arizona also tried to justify its system by
noting that, according to Walton, the aggravating factors were "sen-
tencing factors" and thus were properly presented to a judge. The
Court shot down this argument as well, noting that Apprendi's reason-
ing clearly rendered Walton's test of who decides (judge orjury) based
on the label (element or sentencing factor) invalid. 69 Finally, Arizona
argued that "[e]ven if facts increasing punishment beyond the maxi-
mum authorized by a guilty verdict standing alone ordinarily must be
found by a jury ... aggravating circumstances necessary to trigger a
death sentence may nonetheless be reserved for judicial determina-
tion. '70 Arizona reasoned that a judicial decision on such facts was
designed to avoid the arbitrariness that often brought death-sentenc-
ing schemes into question. The Court found this argument unpersua-
sive and noted that the Sixth Amendment could not give way to the
admirable goal of fairness. Moreover, the Court concluded that there
was no proof that a judge would be any less arbitrary than a jury.71
Reiterating that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but ef-
fect," the Court stated that because the judicial finding of an aggravat-
ing factor exposed Ring to greater punishment than was authorized
by the jury's verdict, Arizona's death-sentencing scheme violated
Ring's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.72 The majority con-
cluded that its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence could not be home to
both Walton and Apprendi, and thus overruled Walton.73 The Court
extended Apprendi's reasoning, stating that if the Sixth Amendment
"encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sen-
tence by two years," it must also encompass the "factfinding necessary
to put him to death. '74
68 Id. at 603-04.
69 Id. at 604-05.
70 Id. at 605.
71 Id. at 607-08.
'72 Id. at 604.
73 Id. at 609.
74 Id.
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B. The Concurring Opinions
Writing one of the concurring opinions, 75 Justice Scalia ex-
panded upon the majority's position. Although the majority never
mentioned whether the aggravating factors put to the jury had to be
found beyond a reasonable doubt, Justice Scalia repeatedly stated that
any factors put to the jury must in fact be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.76 "[T]he jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
[means] that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punish-
ment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them ele-
ments of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 77 Notably, Justice
Scalia concluded his opinion by laying out the idea that a judicial
override of a jury's advisory verdict of death may be constitutional as
long as the jury first considered the aggravating factors.78
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Breyer concluded that
he stood by his dissenting position in Apprendi and therefore could
not join the majority's opinion.79 Justice Breyer, however, concurred
in the judgment, basing his reasoning upon the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Justice Breyer's position was
founded upon the premise that juries are better equipped than judges
to gauge the community conscience in determining whether a crime
is serious enough to warrant death as punishment.8 0 A jury, Justice
Breyer concluded, is therefore part of the procedural safeguards re-
quired by the Eighth Amendment.81
C. The Dissent
Writing for herself and ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor
authored the dissent. Justice O'Connor immediately admitted that
Walton and Apprendi were incompatible, but dissented on the basis
75 Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer each wrote separate concur-
ring opinions. Id. at 610, 613.
76 Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
that our Constitution has enshrined the requirement that any facts, including aggra-
vating factors, must be found by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases).
78 Id. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Scalia criticized Justice Breyer's
position stating that " [t] here is really no way in which Justice Breyer can travel with
the happy band that reaches today's result unless he says yes to Apprendi. Concisely
put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong flight; he should get off before the doors close, or
buy a ticket to Apprendi-land." Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 614-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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that it was Apprendi that should have been overruled. Justice
O'Connor's dissent echoed her dissent in Apprendi. According to Jus-
tice O'Connor there is no basis-in the past cases, the Constitution,
nor in our nation's history-for Apprendi's reasoning.8 2 Justice
O'Connor noted that her fear that Apprendi would "unleash a flood of
petitions" by convicted felons looking to overturn their convictions
had proven true in the two years between Apprendi and Ring.8 3 Even
though Justice O'Connor's reasoning in her dissent is arguably un-
sound, her conclusion rings true-" [t] he decision today is only going
to add to these already serious effects."8 4
III. ANSWERS TO THE FIF-rH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT QUESTIONS RING
LEFT UNANSWERED
The Court's decision in Ring is problematic. Although it may have
allayed some of the uncertainty in the lower courts, it did so in such a
narrow fashion that the lower courts now face even greater uncer-
tainty on related issues.85 The majority opinion in Ring explicitly de-
clined to address a number of issues directly related to the issue at
hand.86 The Court's unwillingness to address those issues or to even
give direction to the broader implications of Ring has generated a
number of conundrums within the lower courts. This Part explores
the inconsistencies and attempts to resolve them in a manner consis-
tent with the current understanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments in light of Ring.
A. Do Aggravating Factors Have to Be Proven Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt?
At first glance, Apprendi and Ring imply that any aggravating fac-
tors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, some com-
mentators have taken that position. 87 To accept, however, that Ring
stood for such a blanket proposition conflates what the Court actually
said. What the Court said was "[ b]ecause Arizona's enumerated ag-
82 Id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that eighteen percent of peti-
tions for certiorari received by the Supreme Court in the year prior to Ring were for
Apprendi-related issues).
84 Id. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85 See infra Parts III.A-E.
86 Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
87 See, e.g., Priya Nath, Case Note, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123 S. Ct. 732 (2003),
15 CAP. DEF. J. 419, 422 (2003) ("[T]he Ring Court held that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to find the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
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gravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of
a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found
by a jury."88 Nowhere in the majority opinion does it state that aggra-
vating factors per se have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In fact, the reasonable-doubt standard of proof is not a Sixth
Amendment guarantee;89 nor is the reasonable-doubt requirement
embodied in the text of the Constitution. Rather it was a concept that
most common law jurisdictions began adopting around 1798. After
being in common use for over a century, the Supreme Court adopted
the reasonable-doubt requirement as a constitutional guarantee in
1970.90 Constitutionalizing the traditionally used standard, the Su-
preme Court stated:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.91
Thus, only the facts that make up the elements of the crime must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, even after Ring, this
does not lead to the conclusion that all aggravating factors must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Only when aggravating factors
can be functionally equated with being an element of the crime does
the Due Process standard of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-
come into play.92
88 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494, n.19
(2000)).
89 Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment itself
has never been held to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt . ).
90 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of
criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convic-
tions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for
the presumption of innocence-that bedrock "axiomatic and elementary"
principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law."
Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ('[A] person accused of
a crime ... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of
fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the
strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case.'") (citing W. v. Family
Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (N.Y. 1969))).
91 Id. at 364.
92 This contention is supported by the fact that some state statutes explicitly re-
quire aggravating factors to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (2003).
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Although the above stated conclusion is the only logical conclu-
sion that follows from the constitutional guarantees of the Due Pro-
cess Clause and the Sixth Amendment, as well as the Court's line of
cases up through Ring, it is not a conclusion to which all courts have
come. In fact, Justice Scalia, in writing for the Supreme Court, has
circumvented the narrow application of the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard in favor of the blanket application mentioned at the beginning
of this subsection. In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, wrote: "[In Ring], we held that the Sixth Amendment
requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any aggra-
vating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt."93
Justice Scalia's characterization of the Ring holding is not only
inaccurate, but it is the beginning of a slippery slope that could be
used to overturn lower courts that have correctly held that the reason-
able doubt standard applies only to aggravating factors when those
factors act as the equivalent of an element of the crime. Clarity on
this issue is needed so as to avoid inconsistent application and incor-
rect results. The Supreme Court must explicitly recognize that Ring's
holding affects the burden of proof for aggravating factors only when
those factors act as functional elements of a greater offense.
B. Does Ring Apply Retroactively?
Whether Ring applies retroactively could perhaps have the great-
est impact of all the issues surrounding the case. The Supreme Court
never mentioned the issue of retroactivity, thereby leaving it to the
lower courts to decide.94 Decisions of the lower courts on the issue,
however, have resulted in a circuit split.9 5 By leaving the issue un-
93 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) (emphasis added). Although Justice Scalia's state-
ment is troubling, it is uncertain whether he intended the statement to apply as
broadly as it plainly does. In portions of his concurring opinion in Ring, as well as in
an earlier portion of Sattazahn, he seems to understand that both Ring and Apprendi
focus on the fact that a fact must increase the maximum penalty in order to be the
functional equivalent of a crime. See id. at 111; Ring, 536 U.S. at 612. Nonetheless,
the plain language he uses seems to muddle that understanding and could be used as
detrimental precedent.
94 Some state officials have taken the Supreme Court's silence as a cue for not
allowing Ring to be retroactively applied. Paul Duggan, New Rulings Don't Fling Open
Death Row Doors, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at A2.
95 The Ninth Circuit favors retroactive application of Ring, while the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply Ring retroactively. Compare Summerlin v.
Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the Ring decision was not
"merely procedural"; rather, it was also a substantive change that fell under the Teague
exceptions), with Turner v. Crosby, 223 F.3d 1247, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
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resolved the Supreme Court has created an inequitable situation,
which it has previously warned against, by allowing lower courts to
treat similarly situated defendants differently.96 This situation should
provide the needed impetus for the Supreme Court to address the
issue of retroactivity.
Grounded on precedent aided by equitable interest and statistical
findings, Ring should be applied retroactively.97 In order to under-
stand this conclusion one must understand the rules of retroactive ap-
plication as well as each of the circuits' respective positions.
1. Rules of Retroactivity as Promulgated by the Supreme Court
When analyzing a retroactivity claim, the court must first deter-
mine if the case the defendant seeks to have retroactively applied de-
clares a new rule. "In general,... a case announces a new rule when
it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal Government."98 That is, "a case announces a new rule if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defen-
dant's conviction became final."99 If the rule is found to be a new rule
the inquiry proceeds; if not, the retroactive claim is denied.
Once it is evident that a new rule has in fact been established, the
analysis turns on whether the new rule is deemed to be one of sub-
stance or one of procedure. If the rule is declared to be one of sub-
stance, then it is presumptively retroactive. 100 The Supreme Court has
that Ring did not apply retroactively to 2254 petitioners), and Cannon v. Mullin, 297
F.3d 989, 992-94 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Ring was not retroactive because it
did not announce a new substantive rule or fall under the Teague exceptions). In
addition, the Eighth Circuit has declined to address the issue until the Supreme
Court indicates whether Ring should apply retroactively. Whitefield v. Bowersox, 324
F.3d 1009, 1012 n.1 (8th Cir. 2003).
96 In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the disparity in treatment caused by inconsistent retroactive application was problem-
atic in both direct and collateral appeals. Id. at 304-05. The Court illustrated its
concern by pointing to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1981), in which the
Court held that "once a person invokes his right to have counsel present during custo-
dial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be inferred from the fact that
the person responded to police-initiated questioning." Teague, 489 U.S. at 305. After
the Edwards decision, lower courts split on the issue of whether it was to be applied
retroactively. "Thus some defendants . . . received the benefit of Edwards, while
[others] did not." Id. The Court recognized that such disparate treatment of simi-
larly situated individuals was inequitable and intolerable. Id. at 304.
97 Granted, the retroactivity would only be applicable to those states whose sys-
tems were declared unconstitutional by Ring, and perhaps to the hybrid states as well.
98 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 2000).
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instructed that new rules are substantive when they alter the meaning
of a substantive criminal statute. 10 1 "Decisions of 'substantive criminal
law' ... are those that reach beyond issues of procedural function and
address the meaning, scope, and application of substantive criminal
statutes."102 Thus, only substantive rules are eligible for retroactive
application.
Conversely, if a new rule is procedural, and not one of substance,
it is presumed not to be retroactive. 103 Named after the case codifying
this rule, Teague v. Lane, the rule is often referred to as the Teague
retroactivity bar.10 4 A new rule is procedural when it impacts only "the
operation of the criminal trial process" and not the substance.10 5 Ac-
cording to the Teague analysis, procedural rules on direct appeal
should be retroactively applied, but on collateral review "new constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases
which have become final before the new rules are announced," unless
the rule meets one of two narrow exceptions. 10 6 The first exception
looks at whether the conduct has been decriminalized or whether a
certain class of persons has been granted immunity from punishment
for that conduct. 10 7 The second exception requires that a new rule
both enhance the accuracy of the proceeding and "alter our under-
standing of the bedrock procedural elements" essential to the fairness of
the proceeding.'0 8
101 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
102 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1100 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Bousley, 523
U.S. at 620).
103 This rule is relatively new as it was established in Teague in 1989. Teague, 489
U.S. at 310 (1989). For a historical recount of the retroactive application of criminal
procedure guarantees, see 2 RALPH A. RossuM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 292-94 (5th ed. 1999).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 140 (4th Cir. 2001).
105 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100.
106 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
107 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990).
108 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94
(1971)). Therefore, for clarification purposes, once the court determines that a new
rule has been announced, the Teague analysis goes as follows:
The rule is substantive and is therefore presumed to apply retroactively; or
The rule is procedural and is therefore presumed not to apply retroactively
unless:
The conduct at issue has been decriminalized as a result of the new case or a
certain class of persons has been granted immunity; or
The new rule enhances the accuracy of the proceeding and alters the under-
standing of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of the
proceeding.
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2. The Circuit Split on Whether Ring Is Retroactive
Circuits have taken conflicting positions on how the retroactive
standard applies to Ring.10 9 In the first step of the analysis, the circuits
all agree that Ring iterates a new rule. However, the circuits then di-
vide at each subsequent step in the analysis.
The Ninth Circuit has held that Ring stands for a substantive rule
that, depending on the state at issue, may have procedural implica-
tions as well.110 Its conclusion securely rests upon the reasoning that
Ring altered the substantive law of Arizona by declaring its substantive
law unconstitutional and then redefining the elements needed for a
defendant to be sentenced to death by adding an aggravating factor to
the list of elements. I II Since Ring altered the meaning and scope of
Arizona law, the Ninth Circuit contends that Ring should be retroac-
tively applied. 112
Alternatively, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits assert that Ring is
not a substantive rule. "It is clear," says the Tenth Circuit, "that Ringis
simply an extension of Apprendi to the death penalty context" and
"[a]ccordingly, this court's recent conclusion . . . that Apprendi an-
nounced a rule of criminal procedure forecloses [the] argument that
Ring announced a substantive rule."'113 As will be discussed in the
next subsection, 114 such a quick answer is superficial and lacks any
effort to seriously analyze whether Ring in and of itself is a substantive
rule.
In addition to denying substantive retroactive application, the
Eleventh Circuit also denies that Ring should be applied retroactively
based on procedure. Again dismissing Ring as though it is identical to
Apprendi, the Eleventh Circuit held that Ring met neither exception
and thus, as a rule of procedure, fell victim to the Teague retroactivity
bar. 115
Instead of dismissing it as the equivalent of Apprendi, the Ninth
Circuit conducted a more careful analysis that focused on the reason-
ing, holding, and effect of Ring. It concluded that even if Ring an-
nounced a procedural rule, it falls within the second Teague exception
and therefore should retroactively be applied.1 6 After examining sta-
109 See supra note 92.
110 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1101-02.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
114 See infra Part III.B.3.
115 Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003).
116 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121.
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tistics and scholarly work on the topic, the Ninth Circuit found that
"the Ring rule enhances the accuracy of the determination of capital
murder. ... 17 Additionally, the court found that Ring "fundamen-
tally altered the procedural structure of capital sentencing applicable
to all states" by "establish [ing] the bedrock principle that, under the
Sixth Amendment, a jury verdict is required on the finding of aggra-
vated circumstances necessary to the imposition of the death pen-
alty.",1 8 Therefore, Ring passed both prongs of the second exception
and as such was applied retroactively in the Ninth Circuit.
3. The Retroactivity Test as It Should Be Applied to Ring
As the courts agree, Ringsets forth a new constitutional rule. It is
undisputed that a rule must be new "if it expressly overrules a prior
decision,"1 19 and Ring explicitly did that by overruling Walton.1 20 The
new rule avers that where an aggravating factor can be used to in-
crease the maximum penalty, the elements of the crime consist of
murder plus an aggravating factor, thereby making it a separate and
distinct offense from murder itself. As such, the distinguishing ele-
ment, i.e., the aggravating factor, must be decided by a jury in order
for the conviction to comply with the Sixth Amendment right to ajury
trial. 121
Unquestionably Ring has had procedural effects. However,
whether Ring has a procedural effect upon a state's procedure de-
pends on the substance of that state's statute, i.e., whether the aggra-
vating factor increases the maximum penalty available for the crime.
Thus, while Ring has certainly had procedural effects, the rule
iterated in Ring is primarily substantive. In finding that aggravating
factors act as functional equivalents of the offense, the Supreme Court
redefined the elements of the murder statute at issue. The rule in
Ring therefore addressed the meaning and application of a substan-
tive criminal statute. As previously mentioned, precedent dictates that
117 Id. at 1110.
118 Id. at 1116.
119 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993).
120 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that Ring overturned
Walton).
121 Id. ("Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the func-
tional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires
that they be found by ajury.") (citing Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19
(2001)).
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when a rule addresses "the meaning, scope, and application" of a sub-
stantive criminal statute, the rule is substantive in nature.
122
To put it another way, the Supreme Court did not simply find
that aggravating factors had to be presented to the jury as part of the
Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial. Had that been the holding, the
rule would have been purely procedural. The pivotal point in Ring is
that the Sixth Amendment right affects only those statutes in which
aggravating factors are functionally part of the substantive offense.
Ring, therefore, is distinct from Apprendi. In Apprendi, the Court
expressly stated that "[t] he substantive basis for [the state's] enhance-
ment is thus not at issue. '123 In stark contrast, the state's statutorily
mandated capital sentencing scheme was precisely the issue in Ring.
Ring both redefined the statute at issue and identified a new substan-
tive offense-capital murder is now a separate offense from murder
and the distinguishing element is the presence of an aggravating fac-
tor. This change alters the substantive qualities of the crime. As a
new substantive rule, Ring should be retroactively applied.
Even if it could logically be argued that Ring is a rule only of
procedure, it would fall within the second Teague exception thereby
allowing it to be applied retroactively. Supposing the rule was only
one of procedure, the presumption would be against retroactive appli-
cation. The first exception to this presumption, whether the conduct
has been decriminalized or whether a certain class of persons has
been granted immunity from punishment for that conduct, is not ap-
plicable to Ring. However, Ring does fall within the purview of the
second exception, which applies when a new rule both enhances the
accuracy of the proceeding and alters the "understanding of the bed-
rock procedural elements" essential to the fairness of the proceeding.124
When considering Ring's effect on the accuracy of the proceed-
ing, it is important to note that accuracy may be understood as preci-
sion in determining innocence or guilt, 125 both at the conviction and
at the penalty phase. The Eighth Amendment requires the accuracy
122 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614
(1998)); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 51 (1990) (noting that a rule is
substantive where it affects "the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments");
United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that ex-
plaining or redefining elements of an offense is a decision of substantive law); State v.
Correll, 715 P.2d 721, 735 (Ariz. 1986) (stating that changes involving aggravating
circumstances in the ex post facto context were substantive changes to the offense of
capital murder).
123 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000).
124 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
125 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993).
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in capital cases to be of a greater degree than would be necessary in a
non-capital case. 126 Today's death-penalty system teems with er-
rors. 12 7 The procedural effect of Ring, in putting aggravating facts
before a jury instead of before a judge, is bound to increase accuracy
for a number of reasons. 12 8
For example, because aggravating factors that act as elements of
the offense now have to be presented to ajury, the aggravating factors
must now be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Previously, the same
factors went before a judge where the prosecution's burden of proof
consisted of a relatively low threshold of a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Thus, Ring has the effect of raising the standard of proof from
"likely" to "almost certainly." This change means that the prosecution
will have to show more proof to satisfy its burden. In turn, this will
likely ensure greater certainty in the finding of aggravating factors.
Additionally, a number of reasons suggest juries are less suscepti-
ble to outside influences than are judges. The elimination of such
outside considerations will increase accuracy as well. First, judges are
often aware of inadmissible evidence to which the jury is not privi-
leged. Although a judge should ignore this evidence, even a judge
committed to fairness cannot erase inadmissible evidence after she or
he hears it. 1 2 9 Thus, the safer alternative is to allow ajury that has no
knowledge of such evidence to determine whether aggravating factors
exist. In addition, judges are privy to pre-sentencing reports, which
have been found to be problematic as they have the "potential for
introducing inaccurate or misleading information into the sentencing
decision."'l3 0 "The net result, prior to Ring, was a capital sentencing
system that allowed a large amount of inadmissible evidence to be sub-
mitted to capital sentencing judges that could not be considered by a
penalty-phase jury."13 ' By requiring the aggravating factors to be
126 Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 342 (1993).
127 For a statistical analysis of errors in death penalty cases, see JAMES S. LIEBMAN
ET AL., BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1975 (2000), available at
http://justice.policy.net/jpreport; see also Peter Neufeld, Preventing the Execution of the
Innocent: Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1155 (2001)
(detailing the impediments of the current death penalty system).
128 Contra Robert Robb, Arizona's Death Penalty Law More Prone to Error, Bias, TUC_
SON CITIZEN, Aug. 8, 2002, at 6B.
129 See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127 (1966) (noting
that "a judge is exposed to prejudicial information" and that it may be too idealistic to
assume a judge can make an accurate decision with that information in mind).
130 Stephen A. Fennel & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and
Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARv. L. REV.
1615, 1628 (1980).
131 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003).
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presented to a jury, inadmissible evidence will be screened out,
thereby necessarily increasing the quality of evidence presented to the
jury and implicitly increasing accuracy.
"A second primary accuracy-enhancing role of a jury in capital
cases is to make the important moral decisions inherent in rendering
a capital verdict." 13 2 Since many of the aggravating factors are subjec-
tive determinations that will be based upon the morals and norms of
the community, juries are better suited to make those decisions. As
the Supreme Court has previously recognized, "the Government has
'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the com-
munity.' '1 3 3 For example, one of the aggravating factors found in
Ring was that the crime was especially heinous. It is easy to see that a
judge who presides over case after case may become too numb to the
facts of a particular case and may lose touch with the community's
understanding of what constitutes an especially heinous crime.134 A
jury, however, consists of people pulled directly from the community
whose interpretation of what constitutes an especially heinous crime
resembles, most likely, the opinion of the community more than that
of a well-seasoned judge. 135
Finally, judges pose a greater risk of inaccuracy than juries be-
cause judges in many states are elected and thus fall prey to outside
influences that have no place for consideration in the trial process. In
fact,judges are more likely than juries to impose the death penalty.
136
Studies have found that some election campaigns in large part are
based on a judge's capital-sentencing record. 137 Although this may
132 Id. at 1113.
133 Id. (citingJones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (quoting Lowenfield
v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988))).
134 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Judge's Drug Use at Issue in 2 Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2002, at Al (showing an example of a judge who seems to be numb to realis-
tic consequences of imposing the death penalty).
135 This concern directly echoes the apprehensions ofJustice Breyer in his concur-
rence in Ring. Justice Breyer stated that jury members "are more attuned to 'the
community's moral sensibility' and act to 'express the conscience of the community
on the ultimate question of life or death.'" Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519
(1968)).
136 Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759,
793-94 (1995); see Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1, 62 (2002); Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the
Jury Override, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 1017, 1039-44.
137 See John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals,
and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 470-75 (1999); see also
Stephen B. Bright et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial
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not influence all judges, it is still a factor which may contribute to
inaccuracy in some cases. Giving the decision to the jury removes this
concern, thereby reducing the chance of inaccuracy and heightening
accuracy overall. In sum, the risk of error is reduced by relying on a
jury of "twelve individuals who must agree as to the presence of aggra-
vating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, whose continued job secur-
ity is not threatened by their decision, and whose consideration is
based solely on admissible evidence subject to the rigors of cross-
examination." 13 8
With the first prong of the Teague analysis satisfied we move to the
second prong of the Teague analysis which requires that the new rule
must "alter our understanding of bedrock procedural elements" es-
sential to the fairness of the proceeding. 139 In redefining the ele-
ments of the substantive offense at issue, the Supreme Court
necessarily altered our understanding of the bedrock procedural ele-
ments essential to the fairness of the death penalty proceeding. Ring
requires that all procedures conform to its mandate that aggravating
factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty be decided
by the jury. Ring recognized a longstanding structural defect within
our system and corrected that defect. Prior to Ring, death-penalty
proceedings in multiple states violated constitutional protections.
Functionally, defendants in those states were being denied their Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial, for it was not the jury's verdict that
exposed the defendant to the possibility of death, but rather the opin-
ion of a single judge. Since Ring it is clear that states must adjust their
capital-sentencing schemes to fit within the Sixth Amendment frame-
work identified in Ring. Therefore, "Ring ... fundamentally altered
the procedural structure of capital sentencing applicable to all
states."140
The finding of an alteration of bedrock procedural elements is
supported by statistics as well. Ring established minimal standards for
all states, and these standards meant that one fourth of all death pen-
Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases?, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123
(1999) (discussing how politics have interfered with judicial independence in capital
cases).
138 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1116.
139 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
140 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1116. Note also that the Ninth Circuit analogized the
decision in Ring to that of Furman since both declared death sentencing schemes
unconstitutional. Thus, like Furman, the Ninth Circuit argues, Ring too should be
applied retroactively. Id. at 1102-03, 1119-20.
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alty statutes were immediately brought into question.1 41 Tellingly,
Ring declared the procedures used in five percent of all death-row
inmates' cases unconstitutional and brought the procedures of almost
another eighteen percent of death row inmates' cases into ques-
tion. 142 "When viewed in both theoretical and practical terms, Ring
redefined the structural safeguards implicit in our concept of ordered
liberty."' 1 4 3
If one remains unconvinced that Ring should apply retroactively
both because it is substantive in nature and because even if it was not
it fits within the second Teague exception one should turn to policy as
another means of justifying the retroactive application. There are
three main reasons the Supreme Court has identified as justifications
of the presumption that retroactivity should not apply in the procedu-
ral context. First, the Court has stated that blocking retroactivity
serves a deterrent purpose as it holds defendants responsible under
the law at the time the crime was committed.144 In the situation at
hand, however, it would be implausible to think that more crimes will
be committed simply because aggravating factors now have to go to
the jury. Thus, applying Ring retroactively in no way disturbs the first
purpose served by the general rule that new procedural rules are not
applied retroactively.
The second policy concern identified by the Court as justifying
the retroactive bar is that "retroactive application of new rules frus-
trates the judicial need for comity and finality." 145 While this is a legit-
imate concern, finality in the Ring sense is very different from finality
in other types of cases. Finality here means the taking of a person's
life even if the procedures which put him on death row were later
141 Thirty-eight states have death penalty statutes and of those nine were immedi-
ately affected by Ring. Five of those nine were automatically unconstitutional and
four others deemed questionable. Brief for Amici Curiae Alabama, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York Dis-
trict Attorneys Association, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, In Support
of Respondent at 4-5, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (No. 01-488), available at
2002 WL 481140.
142 These figures are based on the following numbers. At the time Ring went to
trial 3517 people sat on death row. DEBORAH FINS, DEATH Row U.S.A. 1 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf. Of those, 169
were from states whose death penalty statues were declared unconstitutional by Ring
and another 629 were from states whose death penalty statutes were brought into
question. Ring, 536 U.S. at 620 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121.
144 Teague, 489 U.S. at 306.
145 Eric J. Beane, Case Note, When It Comes To Capital Sentencing, You Be the Judge:
Ring v. Arizona, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 225, 233 (2003) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 308).
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found to be unconstitutional. Can we really ignore new constitutional
standards and simply continue to execute people for the sake of judi-
cial efficiency and finality?
Finally, the Teague Court stated that retroactive application
should generally not be allowed because the "'costs imposed upon the
State [s] .. .generally far outweigh the benefits.' 1 46 It is true that
great costs will be imposed upon states both as they revamp their sys-
tems to comply with Ring and as they hear retroactive claims. In the
capital context it seems morally repugnant to think that any amount
of costs to the States can outweigh the value of the human life that is
put at risk by not hearing the claim. In conclusion, the life or death
context of Ring's retroactivity debate overrides the policy concerns be-
hind denying retroactive application. Therefore, based both on legal
analysis and policy considerations, Ring should be retroactively
applied.
C. Do Aggravating Factors Need to Be Included in the Indictment?
Also unaddressed by the Supreme Court is the issue of whether
Ring's holding requires aggravating factors to be presented to the
grand jury as part of the indictment. Again, the lower courts have
split on this issue. Federal courts have generally held that at least one
aggravating factor must be alleged in the indictment.1 47 State courts,
on the other hand, have gone both ways. 148
146 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984)
(Powell, J., dissenting)) (alteration in original).
147 See United States v.Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 287 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that at
the federal level the indictment must include at least one aggravating factor); see also
United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 139-1, 2003 WL 22110948, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11,
2003) (finding that "the [aggravating] facts used to justify the imposition of the death
penalty are functional equivalents of elements of the capital offense and must there-
fore be charged in the indictment") (citations omitted); United States v. Regan, 221
F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that in light of Ring and Jones, "it appears
to be a foregone conclusion that aggravating factors that are essential to the imposi-
tion of the death penalty must appear in the indictment"); United States v. Fell, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 469, 483 (D. Vt. 2002).
Although the Ring decision explicitly did not discuss whether a defendant
was entitled to grand jury indictment on the facts that, if proven, would jus-
tify a sentence of death, the clear implication of the decision, resting as
squarely as it does on Jones, is that in a federal capital case the Fifth Amend-
ment right to a grand jury indictment will apply.
Id.
148 Compare Drew v. Warden, No. CR 03-87-10, 2003 WL 21228572, at *3 (D.N.H.
May 28, 2003) (noting that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be
charged in the indictment), with State v. Berry, No. M2001-02023-CCA-R3-001, 2003
WL 185509, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 10, 2003) (holding that despite the fact
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states
that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury."'149 As a result, prosecutors at the federal level must obtain an
indictment before bringing a defendant to trial. The states, however,
are not bound by the Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement.15 0
Nevertheless, about half the states, through their respective state con-
stitutions, guarantee the right to a grand jury in most criminal trials.
It is the split within these states that is problematic.
15 1
Ring should be applied to both federal cases and state cases
(where the respective state constitution has grand-jury indictment re-
quirements) so as to require that an aggravating factor be included in
the indictment.152 Ring held that the aggravating factor was an addi-
tional element to the core crime, thereby creating a new substantive
offense, i.e., the aggravated crime. 15 3 Because the holding stated that
the aggravating factor constituted the functional equivalent of an ele-
ment of the offense, it is axiomatic that the aggravating factor, as an
element, deserves the same constitutional protections as every other
element of the crime.1 54 Where the federal or state constitution guar-
antees that an indictment be handed down by a grand jury before a
person is put on trial, each element of that crime must be contained
in the indictment so as to properly put the defendant on notice.
155
that Tennessee's constitution has a provision identical to the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, Ring does not necessitate the inclusion of aggravating fac-
tors in the indictment).
149 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150 In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Supreme Court held that
states are not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment to abide by the grand jury re-
quirement of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 538.
151 For the discussion in this section the term "states" shall mean only those states
whose constitutions give defendants the right to a grand jury indictment.
152 Although the Supreme Court has not directly considered the indictment impli-
cations of Ring, just after deciding Ring, the Supreme Court vacated United States v.
Allen, 247 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2001), instructing the appeals court to reconsider the
indictment claim in light of Ring. Allen v. United States, 536 U.S. 953 (2002); see
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: Court to Review Mandatory Detention of Immi-
grant Felons, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at A1O.
153 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605 (2002) (quoting Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530
U.S. 466, 501 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
154 See Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 715-17 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concur-
ring) (stating that an "aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death
sentence must be subjected to the same rigors of proof as every other element of the
charged offense").
155 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) ("[A]n indictment is suffi-
cient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a
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Thus, where the substantive offense includes an aggravating factor as
an element of the offense-a new phenomenon since Ring-that fac-
tor/element must also be alleged in the indictment. Concisely put,
"[i]t is no doubt true . . . that the Fifth Amendment right to be
charged by an indictment containing every element of the offense [or
the state equivalent thereof] is no less demanding than the Sixth
Amendment right to have every element of the offense found by the
jury."156
Misguided state courts that have held that Ring does not extend
to the indictment phase miss the true holding of Ring since they often
skim over the issue, dismissing it as identical to issues Apprendi already
decided. For example, an Illinois appellate court held that the defen-
dant's "Ring argument" was simply a cloak for an Apprendi argument
that had already been rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court.1 57
In this blatant circumvention of the issue, the Illinois appellate
court failed to examine the facts of the case in light of Ring. Had the
court not dismissed the Ring claim as a dressed up version of Apprendi,
it would have realized that the defendant had a valid claim. The Illi-
nois State Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment in the
penitentiary unless the initial charge has been brought by indictment
of a grand jury."1 58 Based on the previously mentioned provision of
the Illinois Constitution and in light of Ring, the defendant chal-
lenged an Illinois law stating that aggravating factors could be intro-
duced after the indictment. In the defendant's case, the aggravating
factor had been introduced after the indictment and that same aggra-
vating factor had increased the maximum penalty for which the defen-
dant was eligible.1 59 As was the case in Ring, the aggravating factor
brought against the defendant here acted as the functional equivalent
of an element since the addition of that factor effectively created a
new aggravated offense for which the maximum penalty increased.
Being a functional equivalent of an element, the qualifying aggravator
was entitled to be included in the indictment as guaranteed by the
Illinois Constitution.
defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to
plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.").
156 United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 285 (4th Cir. 2003).
157 People v. McClain, 799 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
158 ILL. CONST. art I., § 7.
159 McClain, 799 N.E.2d at 335.
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D. Does Ring Affect the Hybrid States?
The question of how Ring'affects the hybrid states, i.e., states in
which juries make a recommendation of life or death but still leave
the ultimate decision to the judge, has probably received the most
attention. 160 Hybrid states include Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and
Indiana. 16 1 "Although Ring... did not directly address judicial over-
rides, the Court's... holding suggests that the use of overrides may be
unconstitutional."'162 Even though statutes in each of these states pro-
vide for juries to make recommendations based in part on aggravating
factors, that alone does not save them from constitutional scrutiny.
After all, the dispositive question is "one not of form, but of effect.
' a63
Thus, each hybrid state must examine the effects of its death-sentenc-
ing scheme to determine if it is in compliance with the constitutional
mandates set out in Ring.
In evaluating their respective statutes, the high courts of the hy-
brid states have split on the issue of whether Ring requires a revamp-
ing of the judicial override systems. Delaware and Indiana, as a result
of judicial cues, both chose to revise their statutes. 16 4 Meanwhile,
Florida and Alabama have both held that their statutes remain consti-
tutional despite the holding in Ring.1 65 Since the positions taken by
Delaware and Indiana are strikingly similar to one another, as are the
160 See, e.g., Benjamin F. Diamond, The Sixth Amendment: Where Did the Jury Go? Flor-
ida's flawed Sentencing in Death Penalty Cases, 55 FLA. L. REv. 905 (2003); Nathan A.
Forrester, Judge Versus Jury: The Continuing Validity of Alabamas Capital Sentencing Regime
After Ring v. Arizona, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1157 (2003); Mike Limrick, Overlooked Conse-
quences of Apprendi: The Unconstitutionality of Indiana's Non-Capital Sentencing, RES GES-
TAE, Apr. 2003, at 19.
161 See sources cited supra note 156.
162 Ingrid A. Holewinski, "Inherently Arbitrary And Capricious ": An Empirical Analysis
of Variations Among State Death Penalty Statues, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'V 231, 236
(2002) (discussing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606-09 (2002)).
163 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585, 586, 602, 604 (2002).
164 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. XI, § 4209 (as amended by 2003 Del. Laws 174); IND.
CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2003); see also Brice v. State, 815 A.2d 314, 320 (Del. 2003) (recog-
nizing that an amendment was needed in order to bring Delaware's sentencing
scheme into compliance with Ring); Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ind. 2002)
("Contrary to Apprendi and Ring, the defendant's sentences ... pursuant to Indfiana
law], were based on facts extending the sentence beyond the maximum authorized by
the jury's verdict finding her guilty of murder.").
165 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West 2003)
(cross-referencing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2003)); Lee v. State, CR-00-
0084, 2001 WL 1299241 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 26, 2001) (holding that a judge's judi-
cial override imposing death when the jury only recommended life imprisonment did
not violate Ring); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002) ("Although
Bottoson contends that he is entitled to relief under Ring, we decline to so hold.").
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opposing positions taken by Florida and Alabama, it is necessary to
critique only one state on each side of the divide. Therefore the sub-
sections below will evaluate Florida's position as well as Indiana's.
1. Florida
Florida's Supreme Court has repeatedly held that its death pen-
alty scheme survives Ring. Whenever the issue has arisen, the Su-
preme Court refers to its initial decision on the issue-Bottoson v.
Moore.166 Bottoson was decided by the Florida Supreme Court only
months after the decision in Ring. In contending that Florida's sen-
tencing scheme remained unscathed by Ring, Florida's high court em-
phasized the fact that the Supreme Court failed to mention overruling
any of its prior decisions involving the capital-sentencing scheme in
Florida.167 As evidenced by Apprendi, however, the Supreme Court's
failure to specifically state that a decision overturns a prior decision is
not a reliable indicator of the functional implications that that deci-
sion will actually have. 168 As the concurring justices in Bottoson ob-
served, it is not enough to rely on cases that predated Ring, rather,
Florida's Supreme Court "has an obligation to evaluate the validity of
Florida's capital sentencing statute in light of Ring."169
Evaluating the validity of Florida's capital sentencing scheme in
light of Ring reveals a number of flaws. In order to identify "Ring
flaws" within Florida's capital sentencing scheme, it is essential to un-
derstand how Florida's statute operates in effect, not form. Under the
Florida statute, the jury first makes a determination of guilt or inno-
cence.1 70 That decision, if guilty, exposes the defendant to a maxi-
mum sentence of only life imprisonment. 171 Then, at the sentencing,
the jury considers aggravating and mitigating factors and makes a rec-
166 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002).
167 Id. at 695 n.4 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Flor-
ida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976)).
168 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court contended that Walton remained good law.
Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). However, the facts in Ring showed
the Court that Apprendi and Walton could not coexist under the umbrella of the Sixth
Amendment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
169 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 711 (Shaw, J., concurring).
170 Id. at 715 (Shaw, J., concurring).
171 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West 2003) (cross-referencing FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2003) (noting that a sentence of death may only be imposed
if sufficient aggravating factors are found to exist at the sentencing stage)).
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ommendation of either life imprisonment or death.1 72 Keep in mind
that the jury is not required to find specific aggravating factors. 173
At this point in the procedure there are already two problems.
First, because "a first-degree murder verdict without additional find-
ings pursuant to section 921.141 subjects a defendant to no more than
a life sentence,' 74 the aggravating factor, as it did in Ring, acts as the
functional equivalent of an element. Hence, to comply with the Sixth
Amendment, it must be found by a jury. However, as already men-
tioned, even though the jury does consider aggravating factors, the
jury does not make a direct finding of the existence of specific aggra-
vating factors. As an element equivalent, at least one death qualifying
aggravating factor must be found by the jury in order to comply with
Ring. Since this is not the case as Florida's statute now stands, the
statute conflicts with Ring.
Even more problematic is the fact that the judge is not bound by
the jury's recommendation. A judge is allowed, under Florida's stat-
ute, to find aggravating facts which have never been presented to the
jury. 175 In turn, the judge can, and in twenty percent of capital cases
does, override a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and in-
stead hands out a sentence of death.1 76 This clearly violates Ring since
it makes it possible for ajudge to impose death on a defendant where
the jury's verdict only made the defendant eligible for life
imprisonment.
The final flaw in Florida's system .is that under Florida law ajury
must unanimously return a verdict of guilt, 177 but a jury need only
have a majority vote for finding aggravating factors. 178 However, as
noted above, "[] ust like the Arizona sentencing scheme at issue in
Ring, Florida's sentencing scheme requires additional findings by a
judge before the death penalty can be imposed," and thus aggravating
factors are functionally elements of the crime. 179 As a functional ele-
172 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
173 Id. at 708.
174 Id. at 721 (Pariente,J., concurring) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.082(1) (West
2002)).
175 Id. at 707-08 (Anstead, C.J., concurring) (citing Morton v. State, 789 So. 2d
324, 333 (Fla. 2001)).
176 An empirical study found that between December 1972 and March 1988, 526
Florida defendants were sentenced to die. Of those, 113 involved cases in which the
judge overrode the jury's life imprisonment recommendation and sentenced the de-
fendant to death instead. Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's Juy
Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 924, 926 (1991).
177 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.440.
178 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 710 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
179 Id. at 721 (Pariente, J., concurring).
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ment, the aggravating factor must be subject to the "same rigors of
proof as other elements, including Florida's requirement of a unani-
mous jury finding."180
Florida's resistance to complying with Ring will become even
more difficult in the months to come. In its most recent term, in
Blakely v. Washington,l8s the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
that under the Sixth Amendment "'any fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be sub-
mitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 182 What is
more, the Court stated that for Sixth Amendment purposes the statu-
tory maximum means "the maximum sentence a judge may impose
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant"183-i.e., "'the maximum [a defendant] would re-
ceive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict
alone.' "1 84 Thus, "[w] hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow,"185 as do the judges in Florida, "the
judge exceeds his proper authority"'8 6 and violates the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights.
Of Florida's three major "Ring flaws," the unanimity flaw can eas-
ily be solved by rewriting the Florida statute to mandate that the find-
ing of aggravating factors must be unanimous. However, the other
180 Id. at 717 (Shaw, J., concurring).
181 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
182 Id. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
183 Id. at 2539.
184 Id. (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
185 Id. at 2537. In describing the role of the jury, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority noted, "[j]ust as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legisla-
tive and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judici-
ary." Id. at 2539. Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that the Founders created the jury as
a "fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure," and went on to
cite the following in support of the Founders' intent: Letter XV by Federal Farmer
(Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315, 320 (H. Storing ed.,
1981) (describing the jury as "secure[ing] to the people at large, their just and right-
ful control in the judicial department"); John Adams, Diary Entry (Feb. 12, 1771),
reprinted in 2 WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS 252, 253 (C. Adams ed., 1850) ("[T]he common
p'ple, should have as complete a control ... in everyjudgment of a court ofjudica-
ture as in the legislature."); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbe Arnoux (July
19, 1789), reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (J. Boyd ed., 1958)
("Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legis-
lative orJudiciary depart, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.").
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
186 Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. AsJustice Scalia noted, "the very reason the Framers
put a jury-trial into the Constitution, is that they were unwilling to trust government
to mark out the role of the jury." Id. at 2540.
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two problems require Florida to essentially revamp its sentencing sys-
tem in order to comply with the new understanding of the Sixth
Amendment announced in Ring. In making such a change, it should
look to the amended statutes of Indiana and Delaware for
guidance. 18 7
2. Indiana
Only two months after the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Ring, the Indiana Supreme Court found that Indiana's sentencing
scheme, as it then functioned, could not survive the mandate of
Ring.88 In Bostick v. State, the defendant had been sentenced to life
without parole. Under Indiana's statute at that time, life without pa-
role could only be imposed where at least one aggravating factor was
found in addition to the elements of the core offense. 189 In Bostick,
the jury was unable to unanimously agree on the existence of an ag-
gravating factor.190 However, after the judge independently found
the existence of aggravating factors, the defendant was sentenced by
the judge to life without parole. 191
In reviewing the case, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that, in
light of Ring, the qualifying aggravating factor was the functional
equivalent of an element and thus could only be found by the jury.1 92
The defendant's sentence was, like Timothy Ring's, "based on facts
extending the sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's
verdict."' 93 To remedy the situation, the state's high court vacated the
sentence and remanded the case to the lower court for resentencing
in accordance with Ring.9 4
In response to Ring, and by extension Bostick, the Indiana legisla-
ture amended its statutory sentencing scheme. Today, Indiana's stat-
ute complies with Ring.195 The first pertinent change provides that "if
187 See sources cited supra note 156.
188 Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ind. 2002) ("Contrary to Apprendi and
Ring, the defendant's sentences ...pursuant to Ind[iana law], were based on facts
extending the sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict finding
her guilty of murder.").
189 Id. at 273.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 273-74.
195 Note that Indiana's statute remedies each of the flaws that exist in Florida's
statute, supra Part III.D. 1. Compare IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2003), with FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 775.082(1) (West 2003), and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 2003).
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the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court whether
the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, or neither,
should be imposed . . . . If a jury reaches a sentencing recommenda-
tion, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly."'196 Given
that a judge can no longer override the jury's sentencing recommen-
dation, it is impossible for the defendant to be sentenced beyond the
maximum penalty available based on the jury's verdict. Thus, in ac-
cordance with Ring, all elements upon which the sentence is based,
including qualifying aggravators, are found by the jury. Additionally,
a later section of the same statute provides that ajury must find that at
least one aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable doubt before it
can impose a sentence of either life imprisonment without parole or
death. 197 Thus, Indiana's new statute not only conforms to Ring's di-
rect holding, but it also acknowledges' 98 that by necessary implication,
qualifying aggravating factors must be found by the jury to exist be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
E. How Are Aggravating Factors and Mitigating Factors to Be Weighed in
Light of Ring?
With the foregoing issues resolved, one question remains-does
Ring affect the way aggravating and mitigating factors must be
weighed? The answer to this question lies in the structure and effect
of the statute. There are two basic statutory structures that must be
taken into consideration. First, in several states the sentencing phase
requires the fact finder to conclude that the aggravating circum-
stances outweigh the mitigating in order to impose a death sen-
tence. 99 Alternatively, some states require the finding of only one
aggravating factor to trigger the imposition of the death penalty.2 00 In
the first instance, assuming that the weighing determination is what
qualifies the defendant for the death sentence, Ring would require
that the overall determination be made by ajury beyond a reasonable
doubt. To illustrate, think about the following example. In State A
the statute for first degree murder exposes a defendant to a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment. However, under the same statute a de-
fendant becomes eligible for death if at the sentencing phase the fact
finder determines that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors. Because the weighing determination acts as the functional
196 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (2003).
197 Id. § 35-50-2-9(1).
198 See supra Part III.A.
199 Holewinski, supra note 162, at 253-55 app. A.
200 Id.
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equivalent of an element, under Ring, it must go before a jury. Thus,
the jury must make the determination of both aggravating and miti-
gating factors. The remaining issue is how must the jury actually
weigh the aggravating factors? Under these types of statutes it is not
the individual aggravating and mitigating factors that act as the func-
tional elements, rather it is the overall determination of how they bal-
ance out that is the qualifying aggravator. Therefore, it seems that a
jury would not have to agree to the existence of individual facts.
Rather, each jury would only have to agree, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the totality of the aggravating circumstances outweighs the
totality of the mitigating circumstances.20 1
Under the second type of statute, where only one aggravating fac-
tor is needed to expose a defendant to the death penalty, Ring would
require only the aggravating factor to go before the jury. Mitigating
factors could still be assessed by a judge at the sentencing phase. An
example is again helpful. State B's statute for first degree murder pro-
vides for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. However, the
statute also provides that the finding of an aggravating factor increases
the maximum penalty to death. Based on this type of statute, it is
simply the aggravating factor itself that acts as the qualifying element.
Thus, only this factor would need to go before the jury. Alternatively,
if the statute in State B says only that the aggravating factor can in-
crease the maximum penalty, but does not mandate an enhancement
in the sentence, it would be constitutional for the judge to consider
mitigating factors once the jury has made a determination on the ag-
gravating factor. Regardless of whether the judge chose to impose life
imprisonment or death after considering the mitigating factors, the
maximum penalty range was still set by the jury upon the finding of
the aggravating factor.
CONCLUSION
As illustrated in Part III and its subsections, a consistent applica-
tion of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is possible. State splits and
circuit splits are brewing. Soon the Supreme Court will have to face
the music and call for conformity in the application of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments as understood in light of its holding in Ring.
201 It is interesting to note that, under this construction, half the jurors could find
that aggravating factor X outweighs mitigating factor Z, while the other half could
find that aggravating factor X is questionable, but that aggravating factor Youtweighs
mitigating factor Z. Despite this reliance on different aggravating factors, the result
would still be that the jury as a whole found that the aggravating facts outweighed the
mitigating facts.
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The rights embodied in the United States Constitution are guar-
anteed to all citizens. Our current and evolving understanding of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments as embodied in Ring must be applied to
each citizen. However, as the legal system currently exists, defendants
in different states receive varying protections depending on whether
the state in which they are charged is correctly applying the new un-
derstanding of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Such an inconsis-
tent application of the same national Constitution must end. This is
especially true in the context of the death penalty since the system
already suffers from errors-errors which can never be undone once
the final sentence is imposed.
